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Abstract
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvigs model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a
framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for
liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others
must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received
by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment, both informa-
tion-induced and pure panic runs will occur. However, banks can prevent them by designing the
deposit contract appropriately. It is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to pre-
vent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior.

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1. Introduction
Banking crises have traditionally been an important source of public concern. Ex-
amples of financial crises in the history of the financial systems were the Great De-
pression (1929 1933) which had a significant impact on the banking system of the
US 1 or the more recent crises in emerging countries. 2
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1 From 1930 to 1933 the number of bank failures in the US averaged over 2000 per year (see Mishkin,
1995)
2 Lindgren et al (1996) find that 73% of the IMFs member countries suffered banking crises between
1980 and 1996
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Given the historical importance of banking panics and their current relevance it is
important to understand why they occur and what policies should be implemented to
deal with them. In this sense, the theoretical research on banking has focused on an
alyzing the microeconomic nature of banks and their role in the economy. Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), which formalized some of the ideas provided in Bryant (1980),
made a significant contribution by modeling the demand for liquidity and the trans
formation service provided by banks. They demonstrated that demand deposit con
tracts, which enable the transformation of illiquid assets into more liquid liabilities,
provide a rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs.
The optimal contract yields a higher level of consumption for those who withdraw
early than the technological return. Bank runs, thus, take place when the idea of de
posit withdrawals spills over economic agents (an essential point is that banks satisfy
a sequential service constraint (see Wallace, 1988)). The model concludes that with
no aggregate uncertainty, a suspension of convertibility policy can hinder the bank
run equilibrium. Otherwise, a deposit insurance policy would be more effective. Di
amond and Dybvigs model attracted severe criticisms (e.g., Gorton, 1988) for as
suming that bank runs are random phenomena, and thus, uncorrelated with other
economic variables. Gorton (1988), in an empirical study of bank runs in the US
during the National Banking Era (1863 1913), found support for the notion that
bank runs tended to occur after business cycle peaks.
Since the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig, economists have used many
variations of this model to explore banking issues. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)
consider a variation of the model with many intermediaries who face privately ob
served liquidity shocks. They show the welfare gains from setting up an institution,
such as a central bank, offering borrowing and lending opportunities at a subsidized
rate. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) introduce smooth preferences and a risky tech
nology and show that the optimality of bank deposits compared to equities depends
on the characteristics of the risky investment. Hellwig (1994) introduces interest rate
risk and shows that as interest rates increase the optimal rate of deposits withdrawn
in the first period should decrease and that of deposits that remain until the second
one should increase. Champ et al. (1996) assume that the fraction of the population
requiring liquidity is random and construct a monetary model where seasonal vari
ations in the demand for liquidity play a critical role in generating banking panics.
Hazlett (1997) makes the technology risky in order to explore the costs and benefits
of deposit insurance. Allen and Gale (1998) also introduce a risky technology and
show that under certain circumstances, bank runs can be first best efficient, as they
allow efficient risk sharing among depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient
portfolios. Alonso (1996) demonstrates using numerical examples that in the Jacklin
and Bhattacharya framework contracts where runs occur may be better than con
tracts that ensure runs do not occur because the former improve risk sharing. Fi
nally, Lin (1996) models a continuum of types and Postlewaite and Vives (1987)
extend the number of periods in the model.
The main objective of this paper is to cover one gap in this theory by extending
the Diamond and Dybvigs framework to a situation in which there is both aggregate
uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and a risky technology.
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It is also assumed that the long term technology can be liquidated early at a cost. As
in Chari and Jagannathan (1988) there is a signal extraction problem in which some
individuals receive a signal about the banks return, and others must infer from ob
served withdrawals whether a negative signal was received by informed depositors or
whether liquidity needs happen to be high. The difference with Chari and Jaganna
than (1988) is that in this model individuals are risk averse and the ex ante optimal
risk sharing contract is presented. 3 As banks operate in a competitive environment,
the optimal contract is the one that maximizes the expected utility of depositors.
Also, banks are informed about the investment return and are fully rational, that
is, they are aware depositors might receive interim information and they can foresee
the consequences of different contract structures. In particular, two different con
tracts are considered: The first contract ignores the impact of interim information
at date 1 and as a result bank runs become a possibility. However, as self serving
bank managers do not want to liquidate the investment (they want to keep their
job) they will suspend convertibility whenever runs occur. It is then assumed that this
suspension measure will only be effective when the bank is solvent. This means that
suspension will be effective when the high value of the investment return is realized at
date 2. In the case in which the low value of the investment return is realized at date 2
and it is lower than the liquidation value of the technology at date 1, then suspension
cannot be sustained and the bank will be liquidated at date 1. In the case of the sec
ond contract, it is designed so that bank runs are always prevented.
The contribution of this paper is to show that bank runs are not always necessar
ily bad in an ex ante welfare sense, that is, in some cases, banks will choose contracts
where runs will occur with a positive probability. 4 It is shown that if the probability
of the low return occurring is below a critical value (p), contracts that allow for runs
would be welfare superior. This critical p will depend on the level of risk aversion,
the average return and the dispersion of the underlying technology. However, the liq
uidation value of the long term technology is crucial in order to determine the supe
riority of the demand deposit contract. If this liquidation value is considered to be
even lower than the low return generated by the long term asset then a contract that
prevents runs by penalizing early withdrawals (and therefore eliminating the with
drawal incentive of individuals who do not need to consume early) dominates the
previous contract. The reason is that a low liquidation value significantly increases
the welfare costs of bank runs, and hence affects the optimality of the demand de
posit contract.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model is pre
sented in Section 2. The risk sharing problem, subject to incentive compatibility, is
presented in Section 3. In this case, the optimal allocation can be made contingent
on the return on the risky asset and the withdrawal queue size, and is considered
as the benchmark case. Section 4 considers the case in which the bank offers a typical
3 Chari and Jagannathans paper raised considerable criticisms due to the ambiguous role of banks or
any other financial intermediary in the model, being assumed that individuals were risk neutral.
4 This issue is also analyzed in Alonso (1996). However, she models a different environment that does
not consider panic aspects and obtains different conditions under which bank runs should occur.
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demand deposit contract, that is not contingent on the return on the risky asset nor
the liquidity needs. In Section 4.1 the bank designs the contract ignoring the impact
of interim information and therefore bank runs will occur under certain conditions.
Section 4.2 considers a quite different case in which the bank designs the deposit
contract so that bank runs are always prevented. A welfare comparison of the two
contracts, using numerical examples, is provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 con
cludes the paper.
2. The model
The model can be summarized as follows: There is a three date period economy
(T ¼ 0, 1, 2) and one single commodity. There is one investment technology, that
for each unit invested at T ¼ 0 generates a random return eR at T ¼ 2. The value
of this random return will be Rl with probability p and Rh with probability 1 p.
It is assumed that 06Rl < 1 < Rh 5 and the average return ðR ¼ pRl þ ð1 pÞRhÞ
is >1. If the production process is liquidated prematurely, then it will yield a liqui
dation value of L. As this liquidation value is crucial for the results, two different
cases will be considered: (a) The liquidation value is lower than the low value of
the random return (L < Rl) and (b) the liquidation value is between the low and
the high value of the random return (Rl < L < 1 < Rh).
On the household side of the economy, there is a continuum of ex ante identical
agents that are endowed with one unit of the consumption good at T ¼ 0 and have
no more endowment in the subsequent periods. They are subject at T ¼ 1 to a pri
vately observed uninsurable risk of being of either of two types. Type 1 (or impa
tient) agents derive only utility for consumption in period one and type 2 (or
patient) agents derive only utility for consumption in period 2. In addition, type 2
agents can privately store the good from date 1 to date 2. In order to obtain numer
ical results, the following form for the utility function is assumed:
UðciÞ ¼ ðci þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
; i ¼ 1; 2; ð1Þ
where c, the constant relative risk aversion coefficient, is assumed to be greater than
one. 6
Also, aggregate demand for liquidity is random, that is, the proportion of type 1
agents can be t1 with probability r1 or t2 with probability r2 (t1 þ t2 ¼ 1 and t1 < t2).
At T ¼ 1 a random fraction, ~a, of type 2 individuals receives information about
date 2 returns and it is assumed that this information is perfect, that is, they know
with probability one the realization of the random return at T ¼ 2. This random
5 The value of Rl is sufficiently low, so that bad information about bank asset quality will lead always to
a run.
6 This function solves the problem that appears when the standard potential utility function is used and
c > 1: Zero consumption has an infinite negative value in terms of utility.
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variable ~a can take a value a with probability q and 0 with probability 1 q. It is
observed that in some states of nature, there will be no informed agents in the model.
As in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), the random proportion of type 1 agents is
needed in order to create confusion between a large withdrawal queue size at the
bank due to liquidity shocks, t2 realized, or negative information shocks.
Finally, and in order for individuals to have a non trivial signaling extraction
problem, the following parameter restriction is assumed (it will become clear later
why this assumption is necessary):
t2 ¼ t1 þ að1 t1Þ: ð2Þ
The state of nature is described by the vector ~h ¼ ð~t; ~a; eRÞ that contains the three
random variables that are independently distributed. Table 1 (columns 2 and 3)
shows the different states of nature and its associated probabilities.
In the model, in line with the standard banking literature, it is assumed that banks
have a comparative advantage in investing in the risky asset. At T ¼ 0 individuals
deposit their funds in the bank in order to take advantage of this expertise. At
T ¼ 1, when the preference and information shocks are realized, they will decide
whether they wish to withdraw at T ¼ 1 or T ¼ 2. The banking sector is perfectly
competitive, so banks offer risk sharing contracts that maximize depositors ex ante
expected utility, subject to a zero profit constraint. In this context, the incentive ef
ficient allocation is identified with an optimal mechanism design problem in which
the optimal allocation can be made contingent on the return on the risky asset (eR)
and the liquidity shock (~t) but not on depositors types. This benchmark case will
be compared with the risk sharing that is achieved in practice through a typical de
mand deposit contract.
3. The ex ante optimal risk sharing problem
It is initially considered the ideal case where banks can write contracts in which
the amount that can be withdrawn at each date is contingent on the random return
(eR) and the withdrawal queue size (~t). The deposit contract will be represented by the
functions ~c1, ~c2, which specify consumption for type 1 and type 2 consumers respec
tively.
Table 1
States of nature
hi i State
~t~aeR Prob.pðhiÞ Aggregate demand for liquidityat T ¼ 1 ðfCT1Þ fCT1 (Theorem 3satisfied)
1 t10eR r1ð1 qÞ t1c1 þ ð1 t1ÞxU t1c1
2 t1aRh r1ð1 pÞq t1c1 þ ð1 t1Þð1 aÞxU t1c1
3 t1aRl r1pq t1c1 þ ð1 t1Þ½ac1 þ ð1 aÞxU c1
4 t20eR r2ð1 qÞ t2c1 þ ð1 t2ÞxU c1
5 t2aRh r2ð1 pÞq t2c1 þ ð1 t2Þð1 aÞxU t2c1
6 t2aRl r2pq t2c1 þ ð1 t2Þ½ac1 þ ð1 aÞxU c1
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The optimal incentive compatible risk sharing problem can be written as follows:
max
~c1;~c2;~K
E~R;~t ~tU ~c1
 hn
þ 1

~t

U ~c2
 io
ð3Þ
s.t.
~t~c16 eKL;
1

~t

~c26 1
 eKeR 8eR;~t;
~c16 ~c2;
ð4Þ
where ~c1 represents consumption at time T ¼ 1 for the type 1 agent and ~c2 con
sumption at time T ¼ 2 for the type 2 agent and that will depend on eR and ~t. eK is the
proportion of the long term investment that is liquidated at T ¼ 1, also contingent
on the random return and the withdrawal queue size. The first two constraints
represent resource balance constraints while the last one is the incentive compati
bility constraint that guarantees that for each possible realization of eR and ~t the
consumption of type 1 depositors should never exceed that of type 2 depositors, that
is, the contract is designed so that individuals self select their type contract.
Equivalently, by eliminating eK from the first and second resource constraints, the
problem could be stated as follows:
max
~c1;~c2
fE~R;~t½~tUð~c1Þ þ ð1 ~tÞUð~c2Þg ð5Þ
s.t.
~t
~c1
L
þ ð1 ~tÞ ~c2eR ¼ 1 8eR;~t;
~c16 ~c2:
ð6Þ
The solution to the above problem is defined below.
Theorem 1. The solution ½~c1; ~c2, to the optimal risk sharing problem is characterized
by the following conditions:
If eR < L:
~c1 ¼ ~c2 ¼
eRL
~teR þ ð1 ~tÞL : ð7Þ
If eR P L:
~c1 ¼
1þ 1~t
R
1
~R
L
 1=c	 

1~tð Þ
L1=c
eRð1cÞ=c þ ~tL ; ~c

2 ¼
eR
L
 !1=c
ð~c1 þ 1Þ 1: ð8Þ
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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It can be observed that if the realized value of the long term asset is lower than its
liquidation value at date 1 (eR < L), then the optimal contract would involve giving
both types of depositors the same consumption and the incentive constraint would
be binding. Otherwise, the patient consumers would receive strictly more than the
impatient ones and the incentive constraint would no longer bind.
For the parameter values shown in Table 2, in case (a), the optimal contract
would be: c1 ¼ 0:200, c2 ¼ 0:205 for t ¼ t1 and R ¼ Rl; c1 ¼ 0:260, c2 ¼ 1:109 for
t ¼ t1 and R ¼ Rh; c1 ¼ 0:199, c2 ¼ 0:206 for t ¼ t2 and R ¼ Rl. Finally, c1 ¼ 0:228,
c2 ¼ 1:057 for t ¼ t2 and R ¼ Rh. The expected utility achieved is U  ¼ 0:122.
Similarly, the optimal contract in case (b) would be: c1 ¼ c2 ¼ 0:297 for t ¼ t1 and
R ¼ Rl; c1 ¼ 0:673, c2 ¼ 1:186 for t ¼ t1 and R ¼ Rh; c1 ¼ c2 ¼ 0:362 for t ¼ t2 and
R ¼ Rl. Finally, c1 ¼ 0:609, c2 ¼ 1:103 for t ¼ t2 and R ¼ Rh. The expected utility
achieved is U  ¼ 0:073.
4. The demand deposit contract
The optimal risk sharing problem of the preceding section serves as a benchmark
for the risk sharing that can be achieved in practice with the type of contracts that
banks are restricted to use. Let a demand deposit contract be defined as a contract
that requires an initial investment at T ¼ 0 with the intermediary in exchange for the
right to withdraw per unit of initial investment (at the discretion of depositor and
conditional on the banks solvency) either c1 units in period 1 or ~c2 units in period
2. The second period random payment will depend on the withdrawal queue size ~t
and the random return eR, 7 so that ct12h will represent consumption at date 2 if the
high return is realized and if the proportion of type 1 consumers is t1. Similarly,
ct12l represents consumption at date 2 if the low return is realized and if the proportion
of type 1 consumers is t1. The unknowns c
t2
2h and c
t2
2l are defined in a similar way.
As mentioned in the introduction, competition forces the bank to offer a deposit
contract that maximizes the expected utility of depositors. Also, banks are informed
of the investment return in the interim period and are fully rational, that is, they are
aware depositors might receive interim information and they can foresee the conse
quences of different contract structures. In particular, two different contracts are con
sidered: In the first subsection the contract ignores the impact of interim information
Table 2
Numerical data
t1 t2 r1 r2 t Rl Rh p R r2 a q c
0.50 0.70 0.90 0.10 0.52 0.21 1.57 0.20 1.30 0.30 0.40 0.99 4.0
Case (a): L ¼ 0:19, case (b): L ¼ 0:54.
7 This uncertain second period return reflects the fact that having invested in a risky asset the bank may
not be able to make its promised payments at date 2.
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at T ¼ 1 and therefore bank runs will occur under certain conditions. In the second
subsection the contract is designed so that runs do not occur.
4.1. The demand deposit contract with runs
The optimal contract choice for a deposit contract, in the absence of interim in
formation can be obtained as a solution to the following problem:
max
c1;c
t1
2h
;c
t1
2l
;c
t2
2h
;c
t2
2l
r1 t1U c1ð Þ
 þ ð1 t1Þ ð1 pÞU ct12h þ pU ct12l 
þ r2 t2U c1ð Þ
 þ ð1 t2Þ ð1 pÞU ct22h þ pU ct22l  ð9Þ
s.t.
t1
c1
L
þ ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2h
Rh
¼ 1; t1 c1L þ ð1 t1Þ
ct12l
Rl
¼ 1;
t2
c1
L
þ ð1 t2Þ c
t2
2h
Rh
¼ 1; t2 c1L þ ð1 t2Þ
ct22l
Rl
¼ 1; ð10Þ
Uðc1Þ6 r1 ð1

pÞUðct12hÞ þ pUðct12lÞ
þ r2 ð1 pÞUðct22hÞ þ pUðct22lÞ: ð11Þ
The first four constraints are the corresponding resource constraints and the last one
is the incentive compatibility constraint, which is expressed in expected terms (using
the ex ante probabilities) given that the contract ignores the impact of interim in
formation at date 1.
The solution to this problem is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The solution c1, c
t1
2h , c
t2
2h , c
t1
2l , c
t2
2l to the demand deposit contract is
characterized by the following conditions:
ct12h ¼
1 t1L c

1
 
Rh
1 t1
; ct12l ¼ ct12h
Rl
Rh
; ct22h ¼
1 t2L c

1
 
Rh
1 t2
; ct22l ¼ ct22h
Rl
Rh
ð12Þ
and c1 is the solution to the following non linear equation:
tðc1 þ 1Þc Rh t1L r1 ð1
(
pÞ 1
t1
L c1
 
Rh
1 t1
	
þ 1

c
þ p 1
t1
L c1
 
Rl
1 t1
	
þ 1

c)
Rh
t2
L
r2 ð1
(
pÞ 1
t2
L c1
 
Rh
1 t2
	
þ 1

c
þ p 1
t2
L c1
 
Rl
1 t2
	
þ 1

c)
¼ 0
ð13Þ
where t ¼ r1t1 þ r2t2
if the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. Otherwise, the unknown c1 must
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
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Suppose now that at T ¼ 0, when individuals deposit their unit of endowment in
the bank, the above contract is offered. At T ¼ 1 or the interim stage, the preference
and information shocks are realized, and so every individual learns his or her type,
that is, they know whether they are impatient consumers, who need to consume in
the interim period or patient agents who prefer to consume at date 2. Also, a fraction
of type 2 or patient consumers will receive a signal that reveals with perfect accuracy
the return of the long term asset at T ¼ 2. Given these shocks, individuals will decide
on the amount they wish to withdraw at each date. The withdrawal decision of type 1
individuals is trivial. As these agents face liquidity needs at date 1, they will always
select their own contract or withdrawal stream (c1). Similarly, informed type 2 indi
viduals will choose to withdraw their funds from the bank, that is, to select the type 1
contract, if they receive a negative information shock. They would maintain their
funds if they receive a positive one. The demand for liquidity of informed agents,
conditional on each state of nature, will be denoted by ~xI. Finally, there are unin
formed type 2 agents, who will try to figure out when a negative signal has occurred
by looking at the size of early withdrawals from the bank. However, this size can be
large enough due to both a negative information shock or to a liquidity shock (those
states of nature in which the highest proportion of type 1 agents is realized, i.e t ¼ t2).
As a result, equilibria have the property that massive bank withdrawals by the un
informed depositors are sometimes due to an incorrect inference that the banks as
sets will yield a low return. Similarly to the informed agents case, the demand for
liquidity for uninformed agents will be denoted by ~xU. In the following lines, we will
characterize the optimal withdrawal decision of the uninformed agents for each state
of nature. Let fCT1 represent the withdrawal queue size or the level of aggregate de
mand for liquidity at date 1 for each state of nature, that is,fCT1 ¼ ~tc1 þ ð1 ~tÞ½~a~xI þ ð1 ~aÞ~xU ð14Þ
where ~xI, ~xU represent demand for liquidity at date 1 for informed and uninformed
type 2 agents respectively. 8 The values of fCT1 are shown in Table 1 (column 4).
We assume that the information partitions of the uninformed type 2 in the con
jectured equilibrium are as follows:
CT1 ¼ t1c1; which implies states h ¼ 1; 2:
As individuals cannot distinguish between the two states they would assign a con
ditional probability p1ð1;2Þ ¼ ð1 pÞr1=ðr1ð1 qÞ þ r1ð1 pÞqÞ to receiving the high
est second period consumption (i.e when eR ¼ Rh occurs) and p2ð1;2Þ ¼ pr1ð1 qÞ=
ðr1ð1 qÞ þ r1ð1 pÞqÞ to receiving the lowest second period one (i.e. when eR ¼
Rl occurs).
CT1 ¼ c1; which implies states h ¼ 3; 4 and 6:
Similarly, as individuals cannot distinguish among those states they would as
sign a conditional probability p1ð3;4;6Þ ¼ ð1 pÞr2ð1 qÞ=ðr2½ð1 qÞ þ pq þ r1pqÞ to
8 Note that the demand for liquidity of informed agents is xI ¼ 0 in states 2 and 5 and xI ¼ c1 in states 3
and 6.
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receiving the highest second period consumption and p2ð3;4;6Þ ¼ p½qþ r2ð1 qÞ=
ðr2½ð1 qÞ þ pq þ r1pqÞ to receiving the lowest second period one.
CT1 ¼ t2c1; which implies state h ¼ 5:
Given the above information partitions, we will characterize the optimal with
drawal decision of uninformed agents for each state of nature.
(i) States 1 and 2: It is optimal for the uninformed agent not to withdraw in states
1 and 2 if the following condition holds:
c1 þ 1
 1c
1 c
6 p1ð1;2Þ
ct12h þ 1
 1c
1 c
þ p2ð1;2Þ
ct12h
Rl
Rh
þ 1
 1c
1 c
: ð15Þ
The left side of Eq. (15) is the utility that the uninformed depositor obtains by
withdrawing in states 1 and 2 and the right side is the expected utility of not with
drawing in those states.
(ii) States 3, 4 and 6: It is optimal for the uninformed agent to withdraw in states
3, 4 and 6 if the following condition holds:
c1 þ 1
 1c
1 c
P r1 p1ð3;4;6Þ
ct12h þ 1
 1c
1 c
264 þ p2ð3;4;6Þ ct12h RlRh þ 1
 1c
1 c
375
þ r2 p1ð3;4;6Þ
ct22h þ 1
 1c
1 c
264 þ p2ð3;4;6Þ ct22h RlRh þ 1
 1c
1 c
375: ð16Þ
Similarly, the left side of Eq. (16) is the utility that an uninformed depositor obtains
by withdrawing in states 3, 4 and 6 and the right side is the expected utility of not
withdrawing in those states.
(iii) State 5: It is optimal not to withdraw in state 5 if the following condition
holds:
c1 þ 1
 1c
1 c
6
ct22h þ 1
 1c
1 c
: ð17Þ
Finally, the left side of Eq. (17) is the utility that an uninformed depositor obtains by
withdrawing and the right side is the utility of not withdrawing in state 5.
Conditions for both information induced and pure panic runs are given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assuming the condition given by Eq. (2) and that Eqs. (15) (17) are sat
isfied, then there exists in the model an equilibrium with bank runs.
Theorem 3 implies bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium in states 3, 4 and 6. In
states 3 and 6 there exist information induced runs as there is a negative information
shock received by the informed individuals which induces the uninformed to with
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draw as well. However in state 4 there is a pure panic run as there is no adverse in
formation held by any agent in this state. In this case the uninformed have mistak
enly withdrawn their funds from the bank.
As mentioned in the introduction, whenever there are runs, self serving bank
managers will suspend convertibility. It is assumed that the suspension level will
be the highest proportion of type 1 depositors. The bank distributes the type 1 con
tract until a fraction equal to the highest proportion of type 1 consumers (t2) has
withdrawn, after that, the bank will only give out all the available second period con
sumption. Clearly, there is a gain in states where there is no information held by any
agent (state 4) and a loss when (i) there is bad information (states 3 and 6) and (ii)
some type 1 depositors (who face liquidity needs) are prevented from withdrawing in
this rationing rule, as it is assumed that agents arrive randomly at the bank and are
then treated on a first come first served basis. Let ~b 9 be the random proportion of
agents of each type that are being rationed by the bank, that is, receive no payment
at date 1. The 1 b remaining agents are those that are able to receive the promised
payment c1 at date 1. This means that total consumption at date 1 should be equal to
the suspension level, that is ð1 ~bÞgCT1 ¼ t2c1 or equivalently, ~b ¼ ðgCT1 t2c1Þ=gCT1
if there are runs and otherwise ~b ¼ 0.
However, this suspension measure is only effective when the bank is solvent. This
assumption is based on Park (1991). 10 This implies that the bank is liquidated in the
bad states, in the case in which the liquidation value of the long term technology is
higher than the low return (Rl < L < Rh). In these states all agents claim the type 1
contract but only a fraction fmax of them will be able to receive first period consump
tion. This means that in these states the first period resource constraint would be
come
fmaxc1 ¼ L ð18Þ
where the long term technology has been totally liquidated in period one, that is,
K ¼ 1.
In the second case, in which the liquidation value at date 1 is lower than the low
return (L < Rl) suspension would be effective, even in the bad states. The ex ante ex
pected utility with suspension of convertibility is derived in Appendix B.1.
For the parameter values considered in Table 2, in case (a), the demand deposit
contract would be: c1 ¼ 0:243, ct12h ¼ 1:235, ct12l ¼ 0:160, ct22h ¼ 0:782 and ct22l ¼
0:102. The expected utility with suspension (Uruns), when liquidation takes place in
the bad states, is 0.151.
Similarly, in case (b), the demand deposit contract would be c1 ¼ 0:638, ct12h ¼
1:288, ct12l ¼ 0:167, ct22h ¼ 0:909 and ct22l ¼ 0:118. The expected utility with suspension
(Uruns) is 0.088.
9 Equivalently, we could have considered ~b1, ~bI, ~bU random proportions of agents of each type.
However, this would have added an additional complication into the analysis, without changing the
essence of the result.
10 This paper shows that suspension of convertibility was a means to prove the banks solvency.
Historically, suspension was only for a brief period and insolvent banks were liquidated.
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4.2. The demand deposit contract without runs
It is now considered a contract which makes sure bank runs will not occur, as a
result of the negative information shock. This contract solves the same problem as
the one in the previous subsection with one exception: There are two additional in
centive constraints that have to be added. These constraints describe when it is ratio
nal for an informed agent to truthfully reveal his type:
U c1ð Þ6 r1U ct12l
 þ r2U ct22l ; ð19aÞ
U c1ð Þ6 r1U ct12h
 þ r2U ct22h : ð19bÞ
However, if the contract satisfies Eq. (19a) it will also satisfy Eq. (19b) (and Eq.
(11)). The optimal contract in this case is obtained by maximizing the ex ante ex
pected utility given by Eq. (9) subject to constraints (10) and (19a). The effect of
imposing this last constraint is to penalize first period consumption up to the point
the withdrawal incentive of individuals who do not need to consume early is elimi
nated.
The solution to this problem is defined by the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The solution c1, c
t1
2h , c
t2
2h to the demand deposit contract is characterized by
the following conditions:
ct12h ¼
1
t1
L
c1
 
Rh
1 t1
; ct12l ¼ ct12h
Rl
Rh
; ct22h ¼
1
t2
L
c1
 
Rh
1 t2
; ct22l ¼ ct22h
Rl
Rh
ð20Þ
and c1 is the solution to the following non linear equation:
ðc1 þ 1Þ1c r1
1
t1
L
c1
 
Rl
1 t1
þ 1
264
375
1c
þ r2
1
t2
L
c1
 
Rl
1 t2
þ 1
264
375
1c8><>:
9>=>; ¼ 0:
ð21Þ
For the parameter values considered in Table 2, in case (a), the demand deposit
contract would yield: c1 ¼ 0:202, ct12h ¼ 1:557, ct12l ¼ 0:202, ct22h ¼ 1:535 and
ct22l ¼ 0:200. The expected utility achieved (Unoruns) is 0.125. Similarly, in case (b),
the demand deposit contract would be: c1 ¼ 0:304, ct12h ¼ 2:261, ct12l ¼ 0:294,
ct22h ¼ 3:178 and ct22l ¼ 0:413. The expected utility achieved (Unoruns) is 0.096.
5. Welfare comparisons: Numerical examples
The previous sections have characterized the level of risk sharing that is achieved
when (i) the optimal contract can be conditioned on the random return and the liquid
ity shock (second best allocation) and (ii) the bank is restricted to use a demand de
12
posit contract, as observed in practice. It is first considered a contract which allows for
the possibility of runs, and secondly, the contract is designed so that runs do not occur.
The aim of this section is to compare, using numerical examples, the above men
tioned risk sharing contracts. In these examples, the allocations are determined as
described in the previous sections.
Let t ¼ 0:52, r1 ¼ 0:90, r2 ¼ 0:10, a ¼ 0:40 and q ¼ 0:99. As it can be observed, it
has been assumed that the lowest proportion of type 1 agents (t1) is realized with a
high probability (r1 ¼ 0:90). The motivation for this assumption is to create confu
sion between a large withdrawal queue size at the bank, due to a high liquidity shock
(t2 realized), or a negative information shock. Also, in all the numerical examples
Theorem 3 is satisfied, that is, bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium. 11
Given these parameters, Figs. 1 4 display the difference between (i) the expected
utility achieved with a demand deposit contract that allows for runs and the expected
utility of the second best allocation and (ii) the expected utility with a demand de
posit contract that avoids runs and the expected utility of the second best outcome,
both as a function of the relative risk aversion coefficient (c). The figures differ in the
probability of the low return occurring (p) and in the liquidation value of the long
term technology (L).
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the case in which the liquidation value of the long term
technology is assumed to be below the bad return (Rl) and the probability of this
low return occurring is 0.20 and 0.40 respectively. A common feature to these two
figures is that a contract that prevents runs attains greater risk sharing than one that
allows for runs, also the former contract approaches the second best outcome. Given
that the long term technology is liquidated only at a loss, this increases significantly
the welfare costs of bank runs and therefore it is always better to prevent runs, al
though this implies penalizing first period consumption up to the point the with
drawal incentives of individuals who do not need to consume early is eliminated.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the case in which the liquidation value of the long term
technology is assumed to be between the low and the high return and the probability
of the low return occurring is 0.20 and 0.40 respectively. The results differ from the
previous cases, as now the superiority between the two contracts will depend on the
probability of the low return. In the case of Fig. 3 (p ¼ 0:20), contracts that allow for
runs achieve greater risk sharing that contracts that prevent runs. As in Alonso
(1996) this is because in order to change the deposit contract so that investors have
an incentive not to run, the depositors payoffs have to be altered in all states of na
ture, hence, a significant loss is incurred with high probability and the gain is only
realized with low probability. This loss is greater in this case than the one incurred
by liquidation. However, in the case of Fig. 4 (p ¼ 0:40), contracts that allow for
runs would be preferred only for very high levels of risk aversion. The reason is that
now, the loss of preventing bank runs by altering the deposit payoffs in all states of
11 It should be mentioned that we have focused on one possible equilibrium in order to explore the
welfare properties of the demand deposit contract in this framework. However, there may exist other
equilibria in the model.
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nature is incurred with lower probability and is less than the one incurred by liqui
dation. 12
Fig. 5 summarizes these results (for the more interesting case in which the liqui
dation value is between the low and high return). It gives the critical probability
(p) below which contracts that allow for runs would be welfare superior, as a func
tion of the relative risk aversion coefficient and assuming different values in the dis
Fig. 2. Expected utility with runs minus second best and expected utility with no runs minus second best
as a function of c, and assuming the probability of the low return is p ¼ 0:40 and case (a).
Fig. 1. Expected utility with runs minus second best and expected utility with no runs minus second best
as a function of c, and assuming the probability of the low return is p ¼ 0:20 and case (a).
12 As mentioned in the introduction this issue is also analyzed in a recent paper by Alonso (1996). In her
case she finds that contracts with runs are beneficial if the probability of a bad signal reaching a subset of
depositors is sufficiently low.
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persion and average return of the underlying technology. It is observed that this crit
ical p is always decreasing in the average return and increasing in the dispersion of
the random asset, measured by the variance of the assets return and is also increas
ing in the level of risk aversion. The effect of risk aversion seems more important the
higher is the dispersion in the long term return and the lower its average return.
These results imply that the region below which it becomes optimal to allow runs in
creases as risk aversion or the dispersion of the long return increase or if the average
return decreases. It could also be shown that the critical probability is increasing in
the liquidation value of the long term asset.
Finally, it should be mentioned that these results hold in the case in which indi
viduals have CRRA > 1. The extension of the above results to a more general utility
Fig. 3. Expected utility with runs minus second best and expected utility with no runs minus second best
as a function of c, and assuming the probability of the low return is p ¼ 0:20 and case (b).
Fig. 4. Expected utility with runs minus second best and expected utility with no runs minus second best
as a function of c, and assuming the probability of the low return is p ¼ 0:40 and case (b).
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function would be a task for future research. However, it should be added that the
specific form of the utility function (the fact that individuals have corner preferences)
is not essential for the above conclusions, that is, the above results would remain
valid if a more general preference structure was considered (where individuals derive
utility for consumption in both periods of their lives).
6. Concluding remarks
This paper combines features of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chari and Ja
gannathan (1988) models to explore in depth the optimality of a demand deposit
contract. We consider a framework in which bank assets are risky, there is aggregate
uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals
receive a signal about bank asset quality. Others must then try to infer from observed
withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether
liquidity needs happen to be high. In this environment information induced and pure
panic runs will occur. In the model there are two types of social costs associated with
bank runs: One is the cost of liquidating the long term investment and the other is
the fact runs occur in some states although no one has adverse information.
In this context, the incentive efficient allocation is identified with an optimal
mechanism design problem in which the optimal allocation can be made contingent
on the return on the risky asset (eR) and the liquidity shock (~t) but not on depositors
Fig. 5. Critical probability below which contracts that allow for runs are welfare superior, as a function of
the relative risk aversion coefficient, and assuming different values in the dispersion and average return.
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types. If the bank could implement this allocation, there would be no bank runs. This
benchmark case is then compared with the risk sharing that is achieved in practice
through a typical demand deposit contract. It is assumed that banks are fully ratio
nal, that is, they are aware depositors might receive interim information and they can
foresee the consequences of different contract structures. In particular, two different
contracts are considered: One contract allows for the possibility of runs while the
other one is designed so that bank runs are always prevented.
In order to analyze the welfare properties of the two contracts, some numerical
examples have been provided. The liquidation value of the long term asset and the
probability of the low outcome are crucial in order to determine the superiority be
tween the two contracts. Two different cases are therefore considered: In the first case
the liquidation value of the long term asset is assumed to be lower than the low re
turn. In this case a contract that prevents runs is always welfare superior and
achieves the second best outcome. The reason is that a low liquidation value signif
icantly increases the welfare costs of bank runs and as a result it is better to prevent
runs although this implies penalizing first period consumption up to the point the
withdrawal incentives of depositors who do not need to consume early is eliminated.
In the second case the liquidation value is assumed to be between the low and high
return. The superiority between the two contracts depends on the probability of the
low return. It is shown that if this probability is below a critical value (p), contracts
that allow for runs attain greater risk sharing than contracts that prevent runs. As in
Alonso (1996), the reason is that in order to change the deposit contract so that in
vestors have an incentive not to run, the depositors payoffs have to be altered in all
states of nature, hence, a significant loss is incurred with high probability, and the
gain is only realized with low probability. This loss is now higher than the welfare
costs associated with bank runs. This critical probability depends on the exogenous
parameters of the model: It is increasing in the level of risk aversion, in the liquida
tion value and in the dispersion of the long term asset. On the contrary, it is decreas
ing in its average return.
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Appendix A. Ex ante optimal risk sharing problem
8eR and ~t the following problem is solved:
max
c1;c2;K
tU c1ð Þf þ ð1 tÞU c2ð Þg ðA:1Þ
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s.t.
tc16KL;
ð1 tÞc26 ð1 KÞR;
c16 c2:
ðA:2Þ
The first order conditions to this problem are the following ones:
oL
oc1
ðc1 þ 1Þct tL k1 k2 0; ðA:3aÞ
oL
oc2
ðc2 þ 1Þcð1 tÞ ð1 tÞR k1 þ k2 0; ðA:3bÞ
oL
ok1
1 t
c1
L
ð1 tÞ c2
R
0; ðA:3cÞ
oL
ok2
c2 c1 P 0: ðA:3dÞ
The incentive constraint is never binding (k2 0).
From (A.3a) and (A.3b):
c2
R
L
# $1=c
c1
 þ 1 1: ðA:4Þ
Substituting the value of c2 in (A.3c):
c1
1þ 1tR 1
R
L
# $1=c" #
ð1 tÞ
L1=c
Rð1cÞ=c þ t
L
: ðA:5Þ
Substituting the values of c1 and c

2 in (A.3d) it can be shown that this case is satisfied
as long as eR P L.
The incentive constraint is binding (k2 > 0).
From (A.3d):
c1 c

2: ðA:6Þ
Substituting (A.6) in (A.3c):
c1 c

2
RL
tRþ ð1 tÞL : ðA:7Þ
Similarly, it can be shown that this case is satisfied as long as eR < L.
18
The expected utility achieved would be:
(a) If L < Rl:
U  r1 ð1f pÞ t1A t1;Rhð Þ½ þ 1ð t1ÞBðt1;RhÞ þ p t1A t1;Rlð Þ½
þ 1ð t1ÞB t1;Rlð Þg þ r2 ð1f pÞ t2A t2;Rhð Þ½ þ 1ð t2ÞB t2;Rhð Þ
þ p t2A t2;Rlð Þ½ þ ð1 t2ÞB t2;Rlð Þg ðA:8Þ
where
AðR; tÞ
1þ ð1 tÞ
R
1
R
L
# $1=c" #
ð1 tÞ
L1=c
Rð1cÞ=c þ t
L
þ 1
8>>><>>:
9>>>=>>;
1c
1 c
;
BðR; tÞ
R
L
# $1=c 1þ ð1 tÞR 1 RL
# $1=c" #
ð1 tÞ
L1=c
Rð1cÞ=c þ t
L
þ 1
8>>><>>>:
9>>>=>>>;
266664
377775
1c
1 c
:
(b) If Rl < L < Rh:
U  p r1Cðt1;RlÞ½ þ r2Cðt2;RlÞ þ r1ð1 pÞ t1Aðt1;RhÞ½ þ ð1 t1ÞBðt1;RhÞ
þ r2ð1 pÞ t1Aðt2;RhÞ½ þ ð1 t2ÞBðt2;RhÞ ðA:9Þ
where
Cðt;RÞ
RL
tRþ ð1 tÞLþ 1
	 
1c
1 c
:
Appendix B. The demand deposit contract with runs
The problem to be solved is
max
c1;c
t1
2h
;c
t1
2l
;c
t2
2h
;c
t2
2l
r1 t1U c1ð Þ
 þ ð1 t1Þ ð1 pÞU ct12h þ pU ct12l 
þ r2 t2U c1ð Þ
 þ ð1 t2Þ ð1 pÞU ct22h þ pU ct22l  ðB:1Þ
s.t.
t1
c1
L
þ ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2h
Rh
1; t1
c1
L
þ ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2l
Rl
1;
t2
c1
L
þ ð1 t2Þ c
t2
2h
Rh
1; t2
c1
L
þ ð1 t2Þ c
t2
2l
Rl
1; ðB:2Þ
U c1ð Þ6 r1 ð1

pÞU ct12h
 þ pU ct12l þ r2 ð1 pÞU ct22h þ pU ct22l : ðB:3Þ
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From the first and second budget constraints it is obtained that ct12l c
t1
2hðRl=RhÞ.
Similarly, from the third and fourth one ct22l c
t2
2hðRl=RhÞ. Substituting the values of
ct12l and c
t2
2l in the above problem, it may be formulated again as follows:
max
c1;c
t1
2h
;c
t2
2h
r1 t1U c1ð Þ
#'
þ ð1 t1Þ ð1
	
pÞU ct12h
 þ pU ct12h RlRh
# $
$
þ r2 t2U c1ð Þ
#
þ ð1 t2Þ ð1
	
pÞU ct22h
 þ pU ct22h RlRh
# $
$(
ðB:4Þ
s.t.
t1
c1
L
þ ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2h
Rh
1; t2
c1
L
þ ð1 t2Þ c
t2
2h
Rh
1; ðB:5Þ
Uðc1Þ6 r1 ð1
	
pÞU ct12h
 þ pU ct12h RlRh
# $

þ r2 ð1
	
pÞU ct22h
 þ pU ct22h RlRh
# $

ðB:6Þ
The FOCS are the following ones:
oL
oc1
ðc1 þ 1Þct t1L k1
t2
L
k2 ðc1 þ 1Þck3 0; ðB:7aÞ
oL
oct12h
r1 ð1
	
pÞ ct12h
 þ 1c þ p ct12h RlRh
#
þ 1
$c

ð1½ t1Þ þ k3
ð1 t1Þ
Rh
k1 0; ðB:7bÞ
oL
oct22h
r2 ð1
	
pÞ ct22h
 þ 1c þ p ct22h RlRh
#
þ 1
$c

ð1½ t2Þ þ k3
ð1 t2Þ
Rh
k2 0; ðB:7cÞ
oL
ok1
1 t1
c1
L
ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2h
R
0; ðB:7dÞ
oL
ok2
1 t2
c1
L
ð1 t2Þ c
t2
2h
R
0; ðB:7eÞ
oL
ok3
r1 ð1
"
pÞ ðc
t1
2h þ 1Þ1c
1 c
þ p
ðct12h RlRh þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
#
þ r2 ð1
"
pÞ ðc
t2
2h þ 1Þ1c
1 c
þ p ðc
t2
2h
Rl
Rh
þ 1Þ1c
1 c
#
ðc1 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
P 0; ðB:7fÞ
and where t r1t1 þ r2t2.
20
From (B.7d):
ct12h
1 t1L c

1
 
Rh
1 t1
: ðB:8Þ
From (B.7e):
ct22h
1 t2L c

1
 
Rh
1 t2
; ðB:9Þ
and the value of c1 is obtained as a solution to one of the following non linear
equations.
(i) The incentive constraint is never binding (k3 0). In this case the non linear
equation is obtained substituting the values of k1 from (B.7b) and k2 from (B.7c)
in (B.7a):
tðc1 þ 1Þc Rh t1L r1 ð1
(
pÞ 1
t1
L c1
 
Rh
1 t1
	
þ 1

c
þ p 1
t1
L c1
 
Rl
1 t1
	
þ 1

c)
Rh
t2
L
r2 ð1
(
pÞ 1
t2
L c1
 
Rh
1 t2
	
þ 1

c
þ p 1
t2
L c1
 
Rl
1 t2
	
þ 1

c)
0:
ðB:10Þ
(ii) The incentive constraint is binding (k3 > 0). In this case, the non linear equa
tion to be solved would be (B.7f) and ct12h and c
t2
2h as given in (B.8) and (B.9).
B.1. Suspension of convertibility
The ex ante expected utility when a suspension of convertibility policy is applied is
defined as follows. 13
If L < Rl:
Uruns E~R;~t;~a
c1 þ 1
 1c
1 c
~tð1
(
~bÞ þ 1
1c
1 c
~t ~b
þ ð~xI þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞ~að1 ~bÞ þ ð ec2 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞ~a~b
þ ð~xU þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞð1 ~aÞð1 ~bÞ
þ ð ec2 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞð1 ~aÞ~b
)
: ðB:11Þ
13 ec2 indicates the dependence on the state of nature ð~hÞ and on the amount of type 2 agents rationed in
the first period ð~bÞ.
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If Rl < L < Rh:
(a) In states 1, 2, 4 and 5:
U1;2;4;5 ¼ E~R;~t;~a
c1 þ 1
 1c
1 c
~tð1
(
~bÞ þ 1
1c
1 c
~t ~b
þ ðexI þ 1Þ1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞ~að1 ~bÞ þ ð ec2 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞ~a~b
þ ð~xU þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞð1 ~aÞð1 ~bÞ
þ ð ec2 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
ð1 ~tÞð1 ~aÞ~b
)
ðB:12Þ
where ~b ¼ gCT1 t2c1=gCT1 if gCT1 > t2c1 and otherwise ~b ¼ 0.
(b) In states 3 and 6:
U3;6 ¼ Lc1
ðc1 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
(
þ 1
#
L
c1
$
11c
1 c
)
pq: ðB:13Þ
So in this case the expected utility with suspension would be: Uruns ¼ U1;2;4;5 þ U3;6.
Appendix C. The demand deposit contract without runs
The problem to be solved is
max
c1;c
t1
2h
;c
t2
2h
r1 t1U c1ð Þ
#'
þ ð1 t1Þ ð1
	
pÞU ct12h
 þ pU ct12h RlRh
# $
$
þ r2 t2U c1ð Þ
#
þ ð1 t2Þ ð1
	
pÞU ct22h
 þ pU ct22h RlRh
# $
$(
ðC:1Þ
s.t.
t1
c1
L
þ ð1 t1Þ c
t1
2h
Rh
¼ 1; t2 c1L þ ð1 t2Þ
ct22h
Rh
¼ 1; ðC:2Þ
Uðc1Þ6 r1U ct12h
Rl
Rh
# $
þ r2U ct22h
Rl
Rh
# $
: ðC:3Þ
The FOCS are the following ones:
oL
oc1
¼ ðc1 þ 1Þct t1L k1
t2
L
k2 ðc1 þ 1Þck3 ¼ 0; ðC:4aÞ
oL
oct12h
¼ r1ð1 t1Þ ð1
	
pÞðct12h þ 1Þc þ p ct12h
Rl
Rh
#
þ 1
$c
 ð1 t1Þ
Rh
k1
þ r1 ct12h
Rl
Rh
#
þ 1
$c
k3 ¼ 0; ðC:4bÞ
22
oL
oct22h
¼ r2ð1 t2Þ ð1
	
pÞ ct22h
 þ 1c þ p ct22h RlRh
#
þ 1
$c
 ð1 t2Þ
Rh
k2
þ r2 ct22h
Rl
Rh
#
þ 1
$c
k3 ¼ 0; ðC:4cÞ
oL
ok1
¼ 1 t1 c1L ð1 t1Þ
ct12h
Rh
¼ 0; ðC:4dÞ
oL
ok2
¼ 1 t2 c1L ð1 t2Þ
ct22h
Rh
¼ 0; ðC:4eÞ
oL
ok3
¼ r1
ðct12h RlRh þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
þ r2
ðct22h RlRh þ 1Þ
1c
1 c
ðc1 þ 1Þ1c
1 c
P 0; ðC:4fÞ
and where t ¼ r1t1 þ r2t2.
From (C.4d):
ct12h ¼
ð1 t1L c1ÞRh
1 t1
: ðC:5Þ
From (C.4e):
ct22h ¼
ð1 t2L c1ÞRh
1 t2
ðC:6Þ
and the value of c1 is obtained as a solution to the non linear Eq.(C.4f) where c
t1
2h and
ct22h are those given in (C.5) and (C.6).
Finally, the expected utility achieved is
Uno runs r1 t1
c1 þ 1
 1 c
1 c
þ ð1 t1Þ ð1 pÞ
ct12h þ 1
 1 c
1 c
þ p
ct12h
Rl
Rh
þ 1
 1 c
1 c
264
375
8><>:
9>=>;
þ r2 t2
c1 þ 1
 1 c
1 c
þ ð1 t2Þ ð1 pÞ
ct22h þ 1
 1 c
1 c
þ p
ct22h
Rl
Rh
þ 1
 1 c
1 c
264
375
8><>:
9>=>;:
ðC:7Þ
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